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ERPJ-16924



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Phone: (703) 351-7676

6 November 1985

Mr. John W. Spring

Dear Mr. Spring:

Thank you for writing Director Casey, for whom I am responding.

I have forwarded your letter to Mr. Casey, along with a copy of your letter to the President (and its attachment), to the appropriate Agency components for their information.

Your interest in the Central Intelligence Agency is appreciated.

Sincerely,

Public Affairs

P-304

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
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Remarks

Executive Secretary
23 Oct 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

Executive Registry

851692/1

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October 11, 1985

The Honorable William J. Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Director Casey:

You may find the enclosed copies of my letter to the President and paper of interest as they relate to current matters of diplomacy, international law, national security, defense, criminal justice, and foreign affairs.

The letter's contents include matters related to the recent terrorist attack in the Mediterranean Sea and "rationale" for similar types of "action" to be taken directly against Nicaragua's neighbors and the United States for its "terrorist" type operations and aid to the contras being aired by news commentators in America.

Sincerely,

John W. Spring
John W. Spring

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P-304

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October 11, 1985

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The purpose of this letter is to inform you and the White House staff of statements and events, which were made and/or transpired during the past two weeks, that should be of direct concern to all members of the Administration. If I were a "trouble-shooter" appointed to your staff, it would have been appropriate for me to share these items more directly with you.

However, first, you and your Administration should be commended for authorizing the interception of the Egyptian airliner, which was transporting the four terrorist hijackers of the Italian liner to Tunisia, and diverting it to land in Italy. Despite the fact that Italian law will not allow criminals to be extradited to a another nation that has a death penalty, it should also be addressed to the Italian Government that the murder of an American citizen took place on board an Italian vessel in international waters. According to my understanding of international law, piracy, in and by itself, is a capital crime. A federal government of any nation is not authorized to modify or delete such punishment. As any person, at sea, has the authority to take any appropriate measures against such a crime on the "high seas" or in the air, the captain of a vessel or plane has an obligation to assure the safety of all passengers and members of the crew while "underway" and "under" his/her control. But when the terrorists took control of the ship, they also relinquished any rights or benefits of Italian law. Since their crimes were committed in international waters, which resulted in the death of an American citizen, they should be initially tried by the government that apprehended them and then by the government of the victim who was killed. However, in all cases, they would be tried by the guidelines established according to international law. If the crimes had been committed within the territorial limits of Italy, then, of course Italian law would prevail as long as it did not violate jurisdiction of international law. Likewise, when the United States Government tries the four terrorists for the alleged murder of an American citizen, it must award sentences in accordance with international law.

Mr. President, on another matter, although it was recently announced that the mass execution-murders, which took place in Nicaragua, by the Marxist-Ortega regime have been confirmed, within the past week, I have heard several members of the news media publicly stating, on American air waves, that, if it were possible to do so, the Nicaraguan Government was be justified in attacking or bombing the United States due to its alleged "terrorist" actions and aid to the contras fighting in Nicaragua.

Whatever is appropriate, Mr. President, I hope that something is said and done by your Administration regarding the aforementioned. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

John W. Spring

WHAT MAY WE EXPECT AT THE SUMMIT?

by

John W. Spring

President Ronald Reagan is expected to meet with Mikhail Gorbachev, leader of the Soviet Union, on November 19 and 20 in Geneva, Switzerland. The news media has been generating relatively high expectations for this forthcoming meeting to the extent of generating serious concern about its possible outcome--especially for the West, more specifically for the United States, and even more directly for the Reagan Administration.

As the President need not concern himself with his future political career, besides some possible concern of future outcome of elections for Republican candidates, the primary concern is then focused on America's national security and the potential leadership role which the United States aspires to have with its allies in West Europe and East Asia, as well as its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere and its other important friends living in more distant lands throughout the world.

We have been informed by the media and others, with influential roles in the United States, that there now appears to be a "generational" change towards younger leaders in the Soviet Union contrasted with its recent "geriatric" heads of state. Actually, there are two important ideas which are being emphasized. The first, "generational" change, implies a possible political difference brought about by the distance in time from an earlier and closer awareness of Soviet doctrine. Such a belief might even suggest more favorable relations with the West and a rapid thawing of the Cold War that has existed for over forty years. Second, younger Soviet leaders suggest positive changes and improved relations with the West. Youth has been a universal symbol of hope for better conditions, but has often been very deceptive as well.


Soviet political history tells us that Mikhail Gorbachev is not the youngest Soviet leader to hold office since the death of Joseph Stalin. In fact that honor went to Georgi Malenkov in 1953 at the age of 51. Soviet leader Gorbachev was 54 when he gained his control earlier in 1985. However, within the Soviet Union, youth has not served as a symbol of leadership permanency. Although Malenkov was the youngest leader after the death of Stalin, he was replaced by Nikolai Bulganin within a period of less than two years. Malenkov was demoted to the position of Minister of Power Stations in 1955, which he held until being further demoted to Manager of the Ust-Kamenogorsk hydroelectric power station in northeast Kazakhstan.

Yes, people forget. Just as Malenkov was demoted to the position of managing a power station, so later was also Dimitri Shepilov, a former Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations. Despite his dynamic and outgoing personality, his current status is unknown in the West. However, now, Mikhail Gorbachev is believed to hold some promises for the future. But the underlying question remains, "Can he deliver on his word?"

While it is true that Gorbachev has not officially held the highest leadership role within the Soviet Union for any great length of time, he has certainly been in many key positions in recent years. However, the same was true earlier of Malenkov, who was later succeeded by Bulganin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid Brezhnev.

JOHN W. SPRING

The Honorable William J. Casey
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505



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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

Executive Secretary

24 April 1985

Date

3637 (10-81)

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Executive Registry

85- 1692

STAT

April 17, 1985

The Honorable William J. Casey
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Director Casey:

If requested, I am willing to fly to Washington for the purpose of meeting with members of Congress on the issue of aid to the Contras.

As a professional geographer, I believe that it is possible to convince a significant number that such aid is a necessity for our nation's security.

My analytical expertise accurately evaluated Soviet construction of missile bases in Cuba prior to the intelligence community's awareness of a Cuban Crisis and its threat to our defense.

I may be reached at

Thank you.

Sincerely,

John W. Spring
John W. Spring

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